Introdução: As aulas virtuais se tornaram o principal meio de ensino das instituições educacionais diante da pandemia, e essa mudança repercutiu diretamente na autoestima dos estudantes e consequentemente nos rendimentos acadêmicos. Objetivo: avaliar a autoestima dos estudantes de enfermagem em contexto pandêmico. Metodologia: Trata-se de um estudo descritivo, com uma abordagem quantitativa. A coleta e análise de dados se deu a partir da escala de autoestima de Rosenberg (The Rosenberg Self-Esteem) e de instrumento complementar desenvolvido pelos autores. A pesquisa foi (...) realizada no Centro de Educação e Saúde da Universidade Federal de Campina Grande, com 155 estudantes do Curso de Bacharelado em Enfermagem. Resultados: Dentre os participantess, 60,7% apresentam valores que indicam uma autoestima diminuída de modo geral. Os números indicam que a maioria absoluta apresentava uma baixa autoestima, decorrente do período vivenciado na pandemia, com uma pontuação entre 7 e 12 no escore, o que representa 89,7% dos entrevistados. Isso mostra que o desgaste vivenciado pelos estudantes durante esse tempo é presente e notório. Conclusão: A baixa autoestima está presente entre os estudantes, como mostram os resultados obtidos através dessa pesquisa, que podem sugerir que essa autoestima diminuída seja advinda do período vivenciado pela pandemia. (shrink)

Mental imagery of movement is a potentially valuable rehabilitation task, but its therapeutic efficacy may depend on the specific cognitive strategy employed. Individuals use two main strategies to perform the hand mental rotation task, which involves determining whether a visual image depicts a left or right hand. One is the motor imagery strategy, which involves mentally simulating one’s own hand movements. In this case, task performance as measured by response time is subject to a medial–lateral effect wherein the RT is (...) reduced when the fingertips are directed medially, presumably as the actual motion would be easier. The other strategy is to employ visual imagery, which involves mentally rotating the picture and is not subject to this medial–lateral effect. The rehabilitative benefits of the HMRT are thought to depend on the MI strategy, so it is essential to examine the effects of individual factors such as age, image perspective, and innate ability on the strategy adopted. When presented with pictures of the palm, all subjects in the current study used the MI strategy, regardless of age and ability. In contrast, when subjects were presented with pictures of the back of the hand, the VI strategy predominated among the young age group regardless of performance, while the strategy used by middle-age and elderly groups depended on performance ability. In the middle-age and elderly groups, the VI approach predominated in those with high performance skill, whereas the MI strategy predominated among those with low performance skill. Thus, higher-skill middle-aged and elderly individuals may not necessarily form a motion image during the HMRT, potentially limiting rehabilitation efficacy. (shrink)

QUESTIONS DE METHODE I. Au contraire de Sartre qui, a partir de quelques elements cueillis dans les ecrits de HusserI concernant la conscience ima geante, a bllti sa propre doctrine de!'imagination, nous nous proposons de reconstituer, a partir de ces m~mes elements, ce qu'on pourrait appeler la theort:e husserlienne de l'imagination, c'est-a-dire la theorie que HusserI eut lui-m~me construite, s'il avait reuni en une synthese les elements qu'il a laisses epars. Une entreprise de ce genre est toujours delicate et souleve (...) des prob!emes difficiles - a commencer par celui de sa legitimite. N ous ecartons d'emblee l'objection d'ordre general qui contesterait Ie droit de systematiser dans l'reuvre d'un auteur ce que lui-m~me a laisse disperse et eventuellement inacheve. Par un tel scrupule, on sacrifie sans doute a la rigueur historique mais on est beaucoup moins soucieux de penetrer une pensee dans son dynamisme in terne et profond et, en derniere analyse, on protege les droits de l'archeologie mais non pas ceux de la culture et de son progreso Nous pensons a une difficulte beaucoup plus serieuse; de sa so lution depend l'attitude a adopter en face des textes dont nous devons nous servir dans notre etude. Nous utilisons des ouvrages qui couvrent la totalite de la car riere philosophique de HusserIl. (shrink)

This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, (...) we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II. (shrink)

La ciencia de la información ha intentado consolidar su estatus científico partiendo de concepciones kuhnianas de la ciencia. Tal es así que la noción de paradigma es central para analizar sus problemas epistemológicos. Diversos autores han postulado distintos paradigmas para el área, en el entendido de que la obtención de un paradigma permitirá su consolidación y unificación. Se analizan los principales desarrollos de paradigmas en el marco de la disciplina, así como otros elementos de la perspectiva kuhniana. Se realiza una (...) revisión crítica de la aplicación de las nociones presentes en La estructura de las revoluciones científicas enfocada especialmente en la reconstrucción epistemológica e histórica del campo. Se concluye que la filosofía kuhniana aporta elementos propositivos a la hora de pensar los problemas epistemológicos, puesto que la capacidad de articulación y de generar consensos se encuentra en la comunidad y la asunción de una tradición exitosa de resolución de problemas. (shrink)

This paper provides a Genzten style formulation of the game logic framework GLm (0 m ), and proves the cut-elimination theorem for GLm. As its application, we prove the term existence theorem for GL used in Part I.

This paper follows a Deweyan suggestion and proposes a structure for emotional activity – pattern of sentiment –as a way to grasp emotional experience in its live occurrence by building upon Dewey’s crucial notion of situation. The first part outlines Dewey’s criticisms of James’s idea of emotion, and verifies the ways in which the recent developments of neuroscience overcome Dewey’s criticisms of James. Given that Dewey’s work is a propitious ground for continuing to renew the discourse about the activities of (...) mind (Mendonça 2003), the second part of the paper outlines a pattern for emotional activity, setting up the first steps for a situational approach of Deweyan inspiration to the nature of emotion. I conclude by pointing out how such a pattern may be a unifying tool for the different emotion theories briefly describing some of the rich directions it provides for future research on philosophy of emotion. (shrink)

This article discusses the importance of metaemotions (emotions about emotions), showing their undeniable existence and how they are a critical and essential part of emotion life. The article begins by placing reflexivity of emotions within the general reflexivity of human beings. Then, the article presents the literature on metaemotion, showing some of the problems that surround them, which ultimately will lead to ask if the concept of metaemotion is really necessary. The second part of the article argues for the usefulness (...) of the concept, pointing out its role in establishing distinctions among emotional states as well as further clarifying the nature of emotion, and concludes on pointing out some of the directions for future research on metaemotions. (shrink)

In order to capture the concept of common knowledge, various extensions of multi-modal epistemic logics, such as fixed-point ones and infinitary ones, have been proposed. Although we have now a good list of such proposed extensions, the relationships among them are still unclear. The purpose of this paper is to draw a map showing the relationships among them. In the propositional case, these extensions turn out to be all Kripke complete and can be comparable in a meaningful manner. F. Wolter (...) showed that the predicate extension of the Halpern-Moses fixed-point type common knowledge logic is Kripke incomplete. However, if we go further to an infinitary extension, Kripke completeness would be recovered. Thus there is some gap in the predicate case. In drawing the map, we focus on what is happening around the gap in the predicate case. The map enables us to better understand the common knowledge logics as a whole. (shrink)

Given the recent call to strengthen collaboration between researchers and relevant practitioners, we consider participatory design as a way to advance Cognitive Science. Building on examples from the Learning Sciences and Human−Computer Interaction, we (a) explore what, why, who, when, and where researchers can collaborate with community members in Cognitive Science research; (b) examine the ways in which participatory‐design research can benefit the field; and (c) share ideas to incorporate participatory design into existing basic and applied research programs. Through this (...) article, we hope to spark deeper discussions on how cognitive scientists can collaborate with community members to benefit both research and practice. (shrink)

A PRESUNÇÃO DE INOCÊNCIA - ANÁLISE PRÉVIA.

Human memory likely evolved to serve adaptive functions, that is, to help maximise our chances of survival and reproduction. One demonstration of such adaptiveness is the increased retention of inf...

USO MEDICINAL DA MACONHA: UMA ALTERNATIVA AO DIREITO À SAÚDE.

The article explores how a new dimension of emotion – depth – is crucially important for a better understanding of emotion and its connection to rationality. It begins by identifying that depth is trapped in a circularity in which deep emotions are important because they refer to deep and important aspects of people’s lives. Following Danto’s discussion of deep interpretation (1981), it suggests that it is the contrast between deep and superficial that grants emotional perspective and the ability to identify (...) levels of emotional depth. After arguing that the emotional perspective is grasped by the narrative structure of emotion, it raises several objections that provide the ground to establish a difference between deep and profound. Then the paper concludes that the meaning of emotional depth is only fully understood in the ongoing contrast with the superficial described before, and states how further research on depth of emotion may provide the key to understanding the ambivalent status of emotions regarding their link to rationality. (shrink)

Reasonableness is a core normative concept in Philosophy for Children (P4C), an inquiry model of education that bridges reasoning, feeling and acting within a community. The concept of reasonableness dates back to Aristotle’s ethical notion of phronesis (1141b), and extends to logical (Gewirth 1983), social and political concerns of major contemporary thinkers (Rawls 2001; Rorty 2001). The development of the concept of reasonableness in P4C was part of the reconceptualization of rationality toward the end of the twentieth century, since Lipman (...) and Sharp were among those thinkers who elucidated and advocated the social conception of rationality offered by the pragmatists. Accordingly, in P4C the conception of reasonableness was highlighted as a cornerstone for the understanding of the notion of a community of inquiry (Splitter & Sharp 1995:6; Lipman 2003:22). (shrink)

This paper testifies the crucial importance of Philosophy for Children for Emotional Growth. It begins by establishing the open ended character of emotional processes, showing how feminist philosophers have criticized the fixed conception of negative valence of certain emotions, and how, ultimately, the normative structure of emotions is open to modification. Then, it shows how talking about emotional processes and emotional situations can foster emotional growth once we understand that the acquisition of language and emotional vocabulary is one way to (...) best capture the openended character of emotions. Finally, attention is turned to Philosophy for Children. Taking as an illustration the emotion of hope and its importance to inquiry, the paper concludes by examining in what way P4C both benefits and reinforces the previous insights about emotion theory. (shrink)

The paper aims to better identify the relationship between moods and emotions showing their link to the overall environment. Adopting a Situated Approach to Emotions, 209–227, 2012; Stephan Emotion Review, 4, 157–162, 2012; Stephen et al. Philosophical Psychology, 27, 65–81 2014) enables showing that the link to emotions to the environment is best understood using the term situation, while moods’ link to the environment is best captured by the notion of context. Exploring the difference points out that what is selected (...) as the situation versus the context in a given environment may explain the relationship between emotions and moods, and clarify why, for instance, certain emotions can alter a mood while others do not. The paper begins putting forward the general take on emotions from a Situated Approach to Emotions in line with contemporary discussions of the Situated Approach to Mind. Then, following John Dewey’s conception of situation, the paper distinguishes situation from context, and reviews the hypothesis of equating them with emotions and moods respectively. The analysis is then connected to previous research done on the difference between emotions and moods and, given the insightful outcomes of connecting moods and emotions to other theoretical aspects of the mind, it shows how the link to the environment is a crucial trait to understand emotions and moods dynamics. (shrink)

There is a broad debate in contemporary philosophy of logic on the informativeness of proofs. In this context, informative proofs are demonstrations whose premises do not include the content of the conclusion. D’Agostino and Floridi (Synthese 167(2):271–315, 2009) claimed that proofs are informative if they use _virtual information_. In their terminology, this is the data carried by _dischargeable hypotheses_, assumptions entertained during proof and eliminated before concluding. Although these authors capture several cases of informative demonstrations, they do not explain the (...) nature of virtual information. Why does the use of dischargeable hypotheses increase the informativeness of a demonstration? Following a Kantian inspiration, D’Agostino and Floridi claim that virtual information adds a synthetic feature to our proofs. However, this appeal to Kantianism is misleading: for Kant, mathematics is synthetic because it requires the construction of concepts in pure intuition. On the other hand, the entertainment of provisional hypotheses does not seem to involve the construction of figures in (transcendental) imagination. Exploring a _dialogical_ characterization of logic, I suggest that virtual information results from the dynamics between a reasoner and her audience. When a reasoner provisionally assumes _P_, she enacts potential interlocutors who commit to _P_. Thus, “virtual information” denotes the content of some assumptions of the possible audience of a demonstration. This process of departing from one’s original premises to embrace the suppositions of other people is informative, but it is not synthetic: in this way, the reasoner does not entertain intuitions but only needs to reason through the conceptual content of other people’s premises. (shrink)

The chapter shows how the recognition of reflexivity of emotions is crucial for understanding the role of emotions in reasoning because it highlights the regulatory role of emotion in emotional experience. The chapter begins by showing that to attain a conception of rationality that incorporates feelings, emotions, and sentiments as parts of the reasoning processes requires capturing the emotional landscape in all its complexity, and that integrating the role of meta-emotions is a contribution in that direction. Then introducing the notion (...) of meta-emotions and showing how emotional reflexivity modifies the nature of our emotional world, it is shown how emotions also have a regulatory mechanism that can either be maladaptive or at the center of emotional health. In addition, because meta-emotions provide a test for the more general assumptions of theories of emotions, the chapter ends by showing how adopting a Situated Approach to Emotions is well-suited for explaining the refinement and complexity of emotion regulation. The final reflection of the chapter explains why adopting such theoretical frame of work makes it possible to use the term situation in a technical manner, which then reveals that emotions sometimes are described as causes while other times as reasons in connection to their regulative mechanisms. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, eu procuro mostrar que a leitura tradicional que atribui um procedimento dialético à abordagem aristotélica da acrasia, em Ética Nicomaquéia VII 1-3 provoca um sério problema interpretativo ao tentar compatibilizar a posição socrática acerca da acrasia e os phanomena. Primeiramente, tento mostrar, baseando-me numa análise de Tópicos I 1-2, que o procedimento metodológico, em EN VII 1 1145b2-7, não se caracteriza como dialético. Em segundo lugar, proponho uma leitura em que Aristóteles, passo a passo refuta a tese socrática (...) que nega a existência da acrasia, uma vez que esse tese não é contada entre os phainomena que se quer preservar. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Many interpreters have taken this chapter as advocating a dialectical procedure of enquiry. My claim is that Aristotle does not keep a dialectical attitude towards endoxa or phainomena in this chapter. In order to accomplish my goal, I shall show that EE I 6 does not provide enough evidence for the dialectical construal of it, and that this construal, in turn, hangs on some assumptions brought (...) out from other Aristotelian works (EN and Top.), which do not provide good evidence as well. By the analysis of these assumptions, I intend to show that Aristotle is not carrying out any sort of dialectic, especially dialectic conceived as conceptual analysis seeking the salvage of phainomena or endoxa. (shrink)

Em um artigo influente publicado em meados dos anos 80, Jacques Brunschwig defendeu a ideia de que o debate dialético, para Aristóteles, não resultaria em vencedores e derrotados. Sua defesa é baseada no debate dialético como sendo um trabalho comum entre questionador e respondedor (cláusula koinon ergon [cf. Tópicos VIII.11 161a20-21]) e como um tipo de teste de consistência de uma dada proposição (cláusula dia tēn thesis [cf. Tópicos VIII.4 159a20]). Apesar dos muitos méritos do artigo, penso que o argumento (...) de Brunschwig não considera adequadamente aspectos importantes do debate dialético no que concerne à performance dos debatedores, especialmente acerca dos recursos que o questionador deve usar. Ao não considerarmos esses aspectos, temos dificuldades para interpretar passagens em que Aristóteles recomenda o uso de táticas para enganar o respondedor. Meu objetivo nesse artigo será oferecer uma explicação diferente das cláusulas dia tēn thesis e koinon ergon, de modo que isso implicará uma conclusão segundo a qual o debate dialético honesto pode envolver vencedores e derrotados e manter a observância das duas cláusulas. Palavras-chave: Dialética; Aristóteles; Debate. Winners and losers in Aristotle’s dialectical debate. Abstract: In the mid-eighties Jacques Brunschwig published an influential paper of whose main claim consists in a defence of the Aristotelian conception of dialectical debate as a game without winners and losers. His claim is based on the dialectical debate as being a common work between answerer and questioner (koinon ergon clause [cf. Topics VIII.11 161a20-21]) and as a kind of test of the consistency of a given proposition (dia tēn thesis clause [cf. Topics VIII.4 159a20]). Despite its many merits, I think Brunschwig’s argument overlooks important aspects of the dialectical debate concerning the debaters’ performance, especially the resources that should be used by the questioner. By overlooking these aspects, we end up with several troubles to interpret passages in which Aristotle recommends deceptive tactics in the debate. My objective in this paper is to give a different account the dia tēn thesis and the koinon ergon clauses, which will imply a conclusion by which fair dialectical debates can still have winners and losers and observe both clauses. Key-words: Dialectics; Aristotle; Debate. Ganadores y perdedores en el debate dialéctico según Aristóteles. Resumen: En un influyente artículo publicado a mediados de los años 1980, Jacques Brunschwig defendió la idea de que el debate dialéctico, para Aristóteles, no resultaría en ganadores y perdedores. Su defensa se basa en el debate dialéctico como trabajo común entre el que pregunta y el que responde (cláusula koinon ergon [cf. Tópicos VIII.11 161a20-21]) y como una especie de prueba de la consistencia de una proposición dada (cláusula dia tēn thesis [cf. Tópicos VIII.4 159a20]). A pesar de los muchos méritos del artículo, creo que el argumento de Brunschwig no considera adecuadamente aspectos importantes del debate dialéctico con respecto a la actuación de los debatientes, especialmente con respecto a los recursos que debe utilizar el interrogador. Al no considerar estos aspectos, nos resulta difícil interpretar pasajes en los que Aristóteles recomienda el uso de tácticas para engañar al que responde. Mi objetivo en este artículo será ofrecer una explicación diferente de las cláusulas dia tēn thesis y koinon ergon, de modo que esto implique una conclusión de que el debate dialéctico honesto puede involucrar a ganadores y perdedores y mantener la observancia de las dos cláusulas. Palabras-clave: Dialéctica; Aristóteles; Debate. 1 Pesquisa desenvolvida no âmbito do Edital Universal Nº28/2018 financiada pelo CNPq sob o número 433825/2018-9. Data de registro: 01/08/2023 Data de aceite: 24/04/2024. (shrink)

The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame establishing a general framework to show (...) how recent developments in philosophy of emotions are in line with the far-reaching consequences of Bernard Williams' insights. Then we highlight the way in which there is both an historical relativity to emotions and an intemporal understanding of their ethical role, and use the concept of meta-emotion to reinforce the idea that what makes some emotions moral requires employing Williams' distinction between thick and thin concepts. (shrink)

A general consensus has been reached in health care organizations that the disclosure of medical errors can be a very powerful way to improve patients and physicians well-being and serves as a core component to high quality health care. This practice strongly encourages transparent communication with patients after medical errors or unanticipated outcomes. However, many countries, such as Brazil, do not have a culture of disclosing harmful errors to patients or standards emphasizing the importance of disclosing, taking responsibility, apologizing, and (...) discussing the prevention of recurrences. Medical error is not discussed or approached during medical school. The stigma of error has a strong connection with value judgments, and emotional support for physicians does not exist. This paper suggests that open communication with the patient is essential. Guidance about error disclosure from health care organizations would be helpful for quality and patient safety and for health care professionals in countries like Brazil. (shrink)

The localized commentary focuses on the way in which meta-emotions appear in the last chapter, and how reflexivity more generally is addressed. It shows how meta-emotions require a detailed explanation, which should capture their role and place within the interdisciplinary theoretical proposal in the already dense book. Though the commentary is limited to this specific issue, it is important to acknowledge and admire the proposal for its unity based on an interdisciplinary foundation. It highlights why every theory of emotion seems (...) to capture something important about the nature of emotions. Nevertheless, Mun’s book would have been greatly improved with the connection of her own proposal to previous work done on meta-emotion. Though it is understandable it did not take place in the book, this commentary aims to point out possible future research directions which will connect the unifying hypothesis with reflexivity of emotions. (shrink)

Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about (...) phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive. (shrink)

Os Essays on the Law of Nature relançaram o debate em torno das relações entre a epistemologia e a filosofia política de Locke. O artigo aborda dois aspectos desta obra em que essas relações são particularmente visíveis: a definição lockiana da lei natural e a questão da sua cognoscibilidade. A comparação com as passagens paralelas de Tomás de Aquino, a que Locke alude, permite destacar a singularidade da posição de Locke, pondo em evidência o seu voluntarismo. Mencionam-se alguns aspectos desta (...) concepção da lei natural, que tem o seu fundamento último num certo modo de entender a razão humana e o seu alcance, e enunciam-se algumas das suas consequências. (shrink)

This article examined the personal profiles of the Heads of Government of countries in South/North America and how they communicated with their audiences on institutional measures to contain COVID-19. Analyses were carried out on data collected from Twitter from November-2019 to November-2020. This study includes: i)quantitative analysis, measuring categories and emphases in the communication of tweets, retweets, likes, and comments on matters relevant to the pandemic; ii)qualitative analysis that allowed evaluating speeches to identify political interference and the effectiveness of communication (...) at critical moments of the pandemic. It was possible to infer that each president has his singularities and understanding about Social Media’s use as a more direct communication tool with his audience. It was also found that successful communication is not directly proportional to the volume of messages on Twitter, but to socio-political aspects and institutional leadership that can make a difference in Social Media in combating COVID-19. (shrink)

According to a prominent approach in contemporary formal semantics, the truth of moral assertions depends on a normative perspective imposed on the facts of the world. The implementation of this approach known as indexical contextualism treats the dependence of moral truth on the corresponding moral perspective in analogy with the contextual dependence characteristic of sentences containing indexical terms. Alternatively, the moral perspective is seen as configuring the circumstances of evaluation in which the content expressed by the occurrence of a moral (...) sentence is evaluated as true or false. The moderate version of this alternative view (non-indexical contextualism) considers that the truth of the occurrence of a moral sentence in a context of use is determined by the evaluation of its content in “the circumstance of the context”: the circumstance of evaluation represented by the same indexed set that represents the context of use. The radical version (assessment relativism), in turn, makes the truth of the occurrence of a moral sentence in a context depend essentially on the value of the normative standard in another context, from which the original utterance is assessed. Taking the judgment on the moral status of polygamous marriage as an illustration, the present work examines the competing merits of contextualist and relativist accounts of the use of moral language, especially in situations of disagreement and debate. The paper argues that, while indexical contextualism coupled with adequate pragmatic considerations can explain some relevant disagreement data, the alternative explanation of these data given by non-indexical contextualism is preferable, because it is simpler and more economical. It is also argued that relativism of assessment is better situated than non-indexical contextualism to explain the relevant phenomena of obligatory retraction and therefore to accommodate some discursive possibilities that play a central role in moral debates. (shrink)

Background: Moral distress is considered to be the negative feelings that arise when one knows the morally correct response to a situation but cannot act because of institutional or hierarchal constraints. Objectives: To analyze moral distress and its relation with sociodemographic and academic variables in undergraduate students from different universities in Brazil. Method: Quantitative study with a cross-sectional design. Data were collected through the Moral Distress Scale for Nursing Students, with 499 nursing students from three universities in the extreme south (...) of Brazil answering the scale. The data were analyzed in the statistical software SPSS version 22.0, through descriptive statistical analysis, association tests (t-test and analysis of variance), and linear regression models. Ethical considerations: Approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande. Findings: The mean intensity of moral distress in the constructs ranged from 1.60 to 2.55. As to the occurrence of situations leading to moral distress in the constructs, the frequencies ranged from 1.21 to 2.43. The intensity level of moral distress showed higher averages in the more advanced grades of the undergraduate nursing course, when compared to the early grades of this course (between 5 and 10 grade, average = 2.60–3.14, p = 0.000). Conclusion: The demographic and academic characteristics of the undergraduate nursing students who referred higher levels of moral distress were being enrolled in the final course semesters, were at a federal university, and had no prior degree as an auxiliary nurse/nursing technician. (shrink)

This paper proposes that being able to feel self-pity is important to be resilient against injustices because it enables self-transformation. The suggestion for this reassessment of self-pity as a crucial self-conscious emotion for a more humanistic world aims to be an example of how philosophical reflection can be insightful for emotion research. The first part of the paper outlines a general introduction of philosophy of emotions and a description of how Hume’s analysis of pride changed its meaning and pertinently linked (...) it to human agency. The second part of the paper is devoted to self-pity and aims to offer a modified interpretation of its experience, ultimately suggesting that it is a way to cultivate resistance and endure injustices in the world. It begins by putting forward the generally accepted take on self-pity and then suggests that dismissing self-pity may increase its duration, and ultimately work as a type of denial of the world’s injustices. After describing how self-pity can be seen as a tour de force where the self is in a relationship of pity with itself, it further elaborates how self-pity may be taken as a type of calibration similar to how sleep works for the functioning organism. This makes it possible to interpret self-pity as a way to resiliently resist injustices while not dismissing them and keeping up the struggle to make the world a better place. Finally, the concluding remarks point out some consequences for the education of emotions and possible future research directions to be explored. Analogously to the undeniable way by which Hume changed the meaning of the emotion of pride, the conclusion hopes that a new way to understand self-pity is available. The overall goal is to amplify the already existing psychological descriptions showing the complementary role of philosophical research for the development of emotion research in general. (shrink)